Abstract. In this paper we solve the problem of secure communication in multicast graphs, which has been open for over a decade. At Eurocrypt '98, Franklin and Wright initiated the study of secure communication against a Byzantine adversary on multicast channels in a neighbor network setting. Their model requires node-disjoint and neighbor-disjoint paths between a sender and a receiver. This requirement is too strong and hence not necessary in the general multicast graph setting. The research to find the lower and upper bounds on network connectivity for secure communication in multicast graphs has been carried out ever since. However, up until this day, there is no tight bound found for any level of security. We study this problem from a new direction, i.e., we find the necessary and sufficient conditions (tight lower and upper bounds) for secure communication in the general adversary model with adversary structures, and then apply the results to the threshold model. Our solution uses an extended characterization of the multicast graphs, which is based on our observation on the eavesdropping and separating activities of the Byzantine adversary.
Introduction
In most communication networks, a sender S and a receiver R are connected by unreliable and distrusted channels. The distrust of the channels is because of the assumption that there exists an adversary who, with unbounded computational power, can control some nodes on these channels. The interplay of network connectivity and secure communication between S and R has been studied extensively (see, e.g., [2, 3, 6, 4, 13] ).
Secure communication is based on the problem of secure message transmission (SMT) between S and R. The aim of SMT is to enable a message to be transmitted from S to R privately (i.e., the adversary does not learn the message) and reliably (i.e., R can output the message correctly). In particular, reliable message transmission (RMT) is essential for all transmission protocols, and hence it has been studied exclusively. Normally there are two different measures of security or reliability: perfect (i.e., zero probability that the protocol fails to be secure or reliable) and almost perfect (i.e., an arbitrarily small probability that the protocol fails to be secure or reliable) [7] .
The traditional studies of RMT and SMT consider a point-to-point network setting, where a sending node can transmit a message to a receiving node through a channel they choose. In the threshold model (t-bounded), the adversary is able to control up to t nodes in a network graph. The result by Dolev et al. [6] shows that n > 2t node-disjoint paths are required for RMT and SMT between S and R. In [7] , Franklin and Wright showed that the connectivity for almost perfect security can be reduced by using multicast channels.
A multicast channel allows a sending node to transmit a message to multiple receiving nodes. The study of secure multicast was initiated by Franklin and Yung in [9] . They used hypergraphs to model multicast networks, and studied privacy against a passive adversary (eavesdropper). Goldreich et al. [10] also studied multicast networks, but their work is in the full information model, which is different to the partial broadcast model in which we are interested. At Eurocrypt '98, Franklin and Wright [7] (see also [8] ) first studied a Byzantine (active) adversary on multicast channels in neighbor networks (defined in [9] ), in which a message multicast by a node is received-simultaneously and privatelyby all its neighbors, where a neighbor is a node that shares a common edge with the sending node.
1 They found that with some properties of the multicast channels, only n > t node-disjoint paths are needed for almost perfectly RMT and SMT. However, their setting is based on a strong assumption, that is, all paths between S and R must be neighbor-disjoint (i.e., there do not exist two paths that have a common neighbor node). Indeed, such a strong assumption may not be necessary in general multicast networks, and hence they gave the following open problem:
. . . if these n disjoint paths do not have disjoint neighborhood, then an adversary may be able to foil our protocols with t < n faults by using one fault to eavesdrop on two disjoint lines. An obvious direction of further research is to characterize secure communication fully in this more general (multicast graph) setting.
Wang and Desmedt [14] further investigated the problem of secure communication in a more general multicast graph setting. They conjectured that a general connectivity (weaker than n > t neighbor-disjoint) is the upper bound for achieving perfect privacy and almost perfect reliability (see Section 6 for more details). In another study, Desmedt and Wang [4] (see also [15] ) extended this result. By using examples, they showed that the previously conjectured connectivity of [14] is not necessary, and they also proposed a lower bound for SMT and conjectured its tightness. Since it is very difficult to apply the threshold model in general mul-ticast graphs, up until this day, there has been no result that gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for RMT and SMT in multicast graphs.
Our contributions. We completely solve the problem of secure communication in multicast graphs (neighbor network setting), which has been open and studied for over a decade. We view this problem from a new direction. That is, our solution is based on two basic ideas: (1) a general graph setting can be applied naturally in the general adversary model with adversary structures (see, e.g., [11, 13, 5, 17] ); (2) a threshold corresponds to a special adversary structure. Thus we study multicast graphs in the general adversary model, and then apply the results to the threshold model.
We found that the current adversary structure model is not enough to characterize multicast graphs. Therefore, in Section 3, we give an extended characterization of the multicast graphs, which is based on our observation on the eavesdropping and separating activities of the adversary on the multicast channels. This characterization gives a clearer view on how the message can be securely transmitted over multicast graphs.
With the new characterization, we give the necessary and sufficient conditions for RMT and SMT respectively in Section 4 and Section 5. Besides proving that our conditions imply the lower bounds on network connectivity, we also provide message transmission protocols to show that these bounds are tight.
Finally in Section 6, we use our results in the general adversary model to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for RMT and SMT in the threshold model. Also by analyzing the previous results, we show how our results explain all the examples and prove all the conjectures in the previous work. Our final result regarding the tight bounds on network connectivity for RMT and SMT in multicast graphs is presented at the end of this paper.
Model
We abstract away the concrete network structure and model a multicast communication neighbor network by an undirected graph G(V, E), whose nodes are the parties in the network and edges are private and authenticated multicast channels. Let S, R ∈ V , the paths between S and R are not necessarily nodedisjoint.
2
Let F be a sufficiently large finite field, we assume that M ⊆ F is the message space from which S chooses messages. Let A be a set, we use |A| to denote the number of elements in A, and we write a ∈ R A to indicate that a is chosen from A with respect to uniform distribution.
In the threshold model, an adversary can control up to t nodes in a graph, and hence control up to t node-disjoint paths. In the general adversary model, an adversary is characterized by an adversary structure, which is defined as follows (see [12, 11] ): Given a party set P , an adversary structure A on P is a subset of 2 P such that for any A ∈ 2 P , if A ∈ A and A ⊇ A , then A ∈ A. The adversary is able to choose one set A ∈ A to control. It is straightforward that the threshold model is a special case of the general adversary model, because a threshold t can be seen as a special adversary structure A such that any set A ∈ 2 P that has t parties or less is in A. In this paper we consider a Byzantine adversary who can exhibit an active behavior. A Byzantine adversary has unlimited resources and computational power. Not only can the adversary read the traffic through the parties it controls, but it can also decide, whether to deny or to modify the message, whether to follow the protocol or not, etc.
We use the security model given by Franklin and Wright [7] . Let Π be an SMT protocol. S starts with a message m S drawn from a message space M. At the end of Π, R outputs a message m R . For any execution of the protocol Π, let adv be the adversary's view of the entire protocol, i.e., the behavior of the faulty nodes, the initial state of the adversary, and the coin flips of the adversary during the execution. We write adv(m, r) to denote the adversary's view when m S = m and when the coin flips of the adversary are r.
Privacy. Π is -private if, for any two messages m 1 , m 2 ∈ M and any r, we
The probabilities are taken over the coin flips of the honest parties, and the sum is over all possible values of the adversary's view. Reliability. Π is δ-reliable if, with probability at least 1 − δ, R outputs m R = m S at the end of the protocol. The probability is over the choice of m S and the coin flips of all parties. Security. Π is ( , δ)-secure if it is -private and δ-reliable.
We say Π is perfectly secure (PSMT) if it is a (0, 0)-SMT protocol. In this paper, we also discuss reliability (without requirement for privacy): δ-RMT, 0-RMT, and almost perfect security: ( , δ)-SMT and (0, δ)-SMT. Note that in the rest of the paper, and δ only appear when studying almost perfect security, thus we let > 0 and 0 < δ < 1 2 . We employ the authentication code auth(m; a, b) = am + b for informationtheoretically secure authentication. An authentication key (a, b) ∈ R F 2 can be used to authenticate one message m without revealing any information about the key itself.
Characterization of Multicast Graphs
In this section we characterize multicast graphs based on the adversary structures. We give an extended characterization which is essential for obtaining the necessary and sufficient conditions in the multicast model. This should give a clearer insight to the problems we are dealing with.
We let P be the set of all paths between S and R in a given graph G(V, E). The adversary chooses a set of nodes A ∈ A to control, where A is an adversary structure on V \ {S, R}. For each path p ∈ P , we define eavesdropping and separating as follows.
Definition 1 We say that the adversary can eavesdrop on p if it cannot control any node on p but can control some neighbors of p.
3 Suppose that the adversary can eavesdrop on p and there is an element a to be transmitted between S and R on p. We say that the adversary can completely eavesdrop on p if, despite what protocol is executed, the adversary can learn a by eavesdropping.
Definition 2
We say that the adversary can separate S and R on p if it can control some nodes on p. Suppose that the adversary can separate S and R on p and there are k elements (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ F k to be transmitted on p. We let (a S 1 , . . . , a S k ) and (a R 1 , . . . , a R k ) be the views of S and R respectively on these k elements at the end of any protocol. We say that the adversary can completely separate S and R if, despite what protocol is executed and how large k is, there exists a strategy of the adversary that causes ∀i (1
Next we show two lemmas regarding the eavesdropping and separating activities of the adversary on a single path p ∈ P . We assume that the path p is placed in a left-to-right direction, with S at the left end and R at the right end.
Lemma 1
The adversary can completely eavesdrop on a path p ∈ P if and only if it can eavesdrop on two adjacent nodes 4 on p.
Proof. We first prove the "if" direction. The privacy problem has been studied by Franklin and Yung in [9] . They showed that private communication on p is possible only if, by removing all the faulty nodes and the hyperedges on which the faulty nodes are, path p remains. 5 Evidently, this necessary condition for privacy is satisfied if and only if the adversary cannot eavesdrop on two adjacent nodes on p (See Example 1 following this proof). Thus if the adversary can eavesdrop on two adjacent nodes on p, then it can completely eavesdrop on p.
Next we prove the "only if" direction. We give the following protocol, which allows S to send an element a S to R with perfect privacy, when the adversary cannot eavesdrop on two adjacent nodes on p. First we assume that including S and R, there are k + 2 nodes v 0 , . . . , v k+1 on p. We let S be node v 0 , R be node v k+1 , and v 1 , . . . , v k be the other k nodes from left to right.
Single Path Private Propagation Protocol 1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, v i initiates an element a i ∈ R F and multicasts it.
Thus for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k, v i receives element a i+1 from its right side neighbor node v i+1 .
Fig. 1. Eavesdropping activities on a single path p.
S sets i := 1 and multicasts
Obviously, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k, the element that v i multicasts is an encrypted ciphertext b i = a S + a i+1 . In order to decrypt a S , the adversary needs to learn a pair (b i , a i+1 ) for some 0 ≤ i ≤ k. Since b i is multicast by v i and a i+1 is multicast by v i+1 , the adversary who cannot eavesdrop on two adjacent nodes is not able to learn a S by eavesdropping.
Single Path Eavesdropping Examples.
(a) If the adversary can eavesdrop on two adjacent nodes on path p, then the necessary condition of [9] is not satisfied. For example, in Fig 1(a) , the faulty node is node 4 and the hyperedges are (S, {1}), (1, {S, 2, 4}), (2, {1, 3, 4}), (3, {2, R}), (4, {1, 2}) and (R, {3}).
By removing the hyperedges that node 4 is on, the remaining hyperedges are (S, {1}), (3, {2, R}) and (R, {3}).
Thus p does not remain because edge {1, 2} is removed, and hence the condition of [9] is not satisfied. (b) If the adversary cannot eavesdrop on two adjacent nodes on path p, then the necessary condition of [9] is satisfied. For example, in Fig 1(b) , the faulty node is node 4 and the hyperedges are
By removing the hyperedges that node 4 is on, the remaining hyperedges are (S, {1}), (2, {1, 3}) and (R, {3}).
Thus p remains because all edges on p remain, and hence the condition of [9] is satisfied.
The different separating activities were observed by Franklin and Wright in [7] , but here we extend their result and upgrade their protocol.
Lemma 2 (following [7] ) The adversary can completely separate S and R on a path p ∈ P if and only if it can control two or more nodes on p.
Proof. We refer the proof of the "if" direction to [8] .
Next we prove the "only if" direction. We assume that including S and R, there are k + 2 nodes v 0 , . . . , v k+1 on p. We let S be node v 0 , R be node v k+1 , and v 1 , . . . , v k be the other k nodes from left to right. We show that with the following protocol, the adversary cannot completely separate S and R when k elements (a 1 , . . . , a k ) are transmitted on p if the adversary can control no more than one node on p.
Single Path Distribution Protocol 
End.
Let v e (1 ≤ e ≤ k) be the only faulty node on p. It is straightforward that at the end of the protocol, a Next, we give the following two lemmas, which are trivial so we omit the proofs.
Lemma 3 If the adversary can only control one node v on a path p ∈ P , then despite what protocol is executed on p, there exists a strategy of the adversary that causes the views of S and R to be different except for their views on the elements multicast by v.
Lemma 4 Given a node v on a path p ∈ P , if the adversary cannot separate S and R on p, completely eavesdrop on p, or control a neighbor of v, then during the execution of the Single Path Distribution Protocol on p, the adversary cannot learn the elements multicast by v.
Having these lemmas, we now present an extended characterization ζ A of a multicast graph G(V, E) given an adversary structure A on V \ {S, R}.
Definition 3 Given a graph G(V, E), let A = {A 1 , . . . , A z } be an adversary structure on V \ {S, R} and P be the set of all paths between S and R. An Extended Characterization of G given A is ζ A = {ζ A1 , . . . , ζ Az } where for each
is the set of all paths on each of which there are at least two nodes in
is the set of all paths on each of which there is exactly one node in
is the set of all paths on each of which there is no node in A i , but on each path in P ( * ) i , there are two adjacent nodes that both have neighbors in A i , and
is the set of all paths on each of which there is at least one node in A i .
With the extended characterization ζ A , we know that during the execution of any protocol, by choosing a set A i ∈ A to control, the adversary can separate S and R on P i , completely separate S and R on P (+) i and completely eavesdrop on P ( * ) i . Given any set A i ∈ A, we are particularly interested in the nodes of A i on the paths of P (1) i . For each path p ∈ P
(1) i , we use A i p to denote the single node v ∈ A i that is on path p; i.e., v = A i p. Note that this notation is only used for the paths in P
(1) i .
Definition 4 Given a graph G(V, E)
and an adversary structure A on V \ {S, R}, we say that S and R are highly A-connected if for any set A i ∈ A, we have
Definition 5 Given a graph G(V, E) and an adversary structure A on V \ {S, R}, we say that S and R are lowly 2A-separated if there exist two (not necessarily distinct) sets A 1 , A 2 ∈ A such that (a) P 1 ∪ P 2 = P , and (b) P
(1) 1 = ∅, or for each path p ∈ P
(1) 1 , we have that p ∈ P 2 ∪ P ( * ) 2 or A 1 p has a neighbor in A 2 , and (c) P
(1) 2 = ∅, or for each path p ∈ P
(1) 2 , we have that p ∈ P 1 ∪ P ( * ) 1 or A 2 p has a neighbor in A 1 . We say that S and R are lowly 2A-connected if they are not lowly 2A-separated.
Lemma 5 Given a graph G(V, E) and an adversary structure A on V \ {S, R}, if S and R are lowly 2A-connected, then for any set A i ∈ A, we have P i = P .
Proof. Assume there exits a set A i ∈ A such that P i = P , if we let both the sets A 1 , A 2 of Definition 5 be A i , then it is straightforward that S and R are lowly 2A-separated. Thus we have a contradiction.
Reliable Communication
In this section, we discuss reliable communication with no requirement for privacy. We study almost perfect reliability (δ-RMT) in Section 4.1 and perfect reliability (0-RMT) in Section 4.2.
Almost Perfect Reliability
We give the necessary and sufficient condition for δ-RMT in multicast graphs.
Theorem 1 Given a graph G(V, E) and an adversary structure A on V \{S, R}. The necessary and sufficient condition for δ-RMT from S to R is that S and R are lowly 2A-connected.
Next, we use Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 to show the necessity and sufficiency of the condition respectively. Before we present these two lemmas, we first give the following Lemma 6, which is a key ingredient for proving the necessity.
Lemma 6 If there exists two sets
Proof. This lemma can be easily proven using a similar technique as that in [8, Theorem 5 .1] and [5, Theorem 3] . See the full version of this paper [1].
Lemma 7
The condition of Theorem 1 is necessary.
Proof. It is straightforward that in order to achieve δ-reliability, it is necessary to have P i = P for any A i ∈ A; i.e., P \ P i = ∅.
Next we prove the necessity of the condition by contradiction. We assume that S and R are lowly 2A-separated (i.e., there exist two sets A 1 , A 2 ∈ A as they are in Definition 5) and there exists a δ-RMT protocol Π that transmits a message m ∈ M from S to R. Without loss of generality, we let P 1 ∩ P 2 = ∅. Now if P
(1) 1 = ∅ and P = P (following Definition 5(a)), thus due to Lemma 6, δ-RMT is impossible in the case. In the rest of our proof we let P
(1) 1 = ∅ and/or P (1) 2 = ∅. We make an observation on how protocol Π can achieve δ-reliability. Given a node v on a path p ∈ P , we use (v ∼ p) to denote the tuple of the elements that are multicast by v and received (in any way) by both S and R on p, and let (v ∼ p)
S and (v ∼ p) R be the views of S and R respectively on (v ∼ p). The strategy of the adversary is to choose an e ∈ R {1, 2} and control the set A e . Let d ∈ {1, 2} such that d = e, then R should be able to recover the actual message from the elements received on P d . If, despite whether e = 1 or e = 2, (v ∼ p) S = (v ∼ p) R for any v on any p ∈ P e (i.e., the views of S and R are completely different on P e ), then following Lemma 6, δ-RMT is impossible. Therefore, there must exist an e ∈ {1, 2} such that (v ∼ p)
is guaranteed for some v on some p ∈ P e . We say that the tuple of elements (v ∼ p) where p ∈ P e such that (v ∼ p) S = (v ∼ p) R supports the actual message. Following Lemma 2, the adversary can completely separate S and R on P (+) e and cause ∀(p ∈ P
Lemma 3, for any path p ∈ P
(1) e
R can only be guaranteed if v = A e p. Therefore, there must exist an e ∈ {1, 2} such that the actual message received on P d is supported by some ((A e p) ∼ p) where
e . Next, following Definition 5(b,c), for each path p ∈ P ((A d p) ∼ p) .
To sum up, we can conclude that when the adversary chooses A e to control, then the actual message, which can be recovered from the elements received on P d , should be supported by some ((A
Now during the execution of the protocol Π, the adversary corrupts P e and causes (v ∼ p) S = (v ∼ p) R for all nodes v on all paths p ∈ P e except for p ∈ P
(1) e and v = A e p. This is possible due to Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. As we concluded above, the adversary can always learn ((
d . Thus on P e , the adversary simulates the protocol as S sent a message m ∈ M, and m can be supported by ((A d p) ∼ p), where p ∈ P (1) d . Therefore, at the end of the protocol Π, despite whether e = 1 or e = 2, the view of R always consists of the following:
-on P 1 , a message is recovered which can be supported by ((A 2 p) ∼ p) for any p ∈ P
(1) 2
= ∅), but may not be supported by any other elements received on P 2 ; -on P 2 , a different message is recovered which can be supported by ((A 1 p) ∼ p) for any p ∈ P
(1) 1
= ∅), but may not be supported by any other elements received on P 1 . Thus as we showed in Lemma 6, with probability δ ≥ 1 2 (1 − 1 |M| ), R recovers the wrong message m . We have a contradiction, which proves the necessity of the low 2A-connectivity.
Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p n }, we first generalize some of Franklin and Wright's protocols in multicast graphs.
Full Distribution Protocol
1. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the nodes on path p j execute an instance of the Single Path Distribution Protocol for each node v i on p j to distribute an element a i,j . The nodes not on p j do not multicast anything. 2. At the end of the protocol, on each path p j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), S and R receive a S i,j and a R i,j respectively as the element initiated by node v i on p j . End.
Private Propagation Protocol 1. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the nodes on path p j execute an instance of the Single Path Private Propagation Protocol from S to R in which S sends an element a S j , and the nodes not on p j do not multicast anything. 2. At the end of the protocol, on each path p j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), R receives a R j as the element that S initiated and propagated on p j .
Now we present the following protocol, which achieves δ-RMT for a message m ∈ M in a graph G(V, E).
Reliable Transmission Protocol
1. The nodes of V execute an instance of the Full Distribution Protocol in which for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the elements that node v i on path p j initiates are (a i,j , b i,j ) ∈ R F 2 . Let (a 
, then we say that m k is qualified on (v i ∼ p j ). R finds an A f ∈ A that satisfies the following three α-conditions: α-1 all vectors received on P \ P f are the same, say vector (m l , u i,j,l ); α-2 P
= P , or for any vector (m k , u i,j,k ) received on path p k ∈ P f such that m k = m l , we have that m k is not qualified on any (v i ∼ p j ) where p j ∈ P \ (P f ∪ P ( * ) f ) and v i does not have a neighbor in A f . R then outputs the message m l .
Lemma 8
The Reliable Transmission Protocol is a δ-RMT protocol under the condition of Theorem 1.
Proof. It is straightforward that if the adversary cannot learn some (a i,j , b i,j ) (initiated by v i and multicast on p j ) but a corrupted m k is qualified on (v i ∼ p j ), then the Reliable Transmission Protocol fails. We use RT to denote the event when the above failure occurs and RT to denote the event otherwise. Let n be the total number of paths between S and R and y be the maximum number of nodes on any path, following the proof of [8, Theorem 3.4] , the probability that the protocol fails is Pr[RT ] < yn 2 |F| . This probability is negligible in the security parameter (given F is sufficiently large). Next in our proof, we assume that the above failure does not happen. That is, we analyze the protocol in the event RT .
In the following, we first show that R can always find an A f ∈ A that satisfies the three α-conditions, then we prove, by contradiction, that in the event RT , the message output by R is correct. Now we show that there always exists an A f that satisfies all three α-conditions, at least when the adversary chooses A f to control so that P f is corrupted. Since P f = P (following Lemma 5), we immediately have that condition α-1 is satisfied and m l received on P \ P f is the actual message. If P f , S and R always have the same view on the key initiated by A f p j . Thus it is clear that m l is qualified on ((A f p j ) ∼ p j ), and hence condition α-2 is satisfied. If P f ∪ P ( * ) f = P , then the adversary cannot learn the key initiated by any node v i which is on a path p j ∈ P \ (P f ∪ P ( * ) f ) if v i does not have a neighbor in A f . Thus without the above mentioned failure RT , any faulty message m k = m l cannot be qualified on such (v i ∼ p j ), and hence condition α-3 is satisfied.
Next, using contradiction, we show that in the event RT , the message m l that S outputs is the actual message. For contradiction, we assume that m l is modified by the adversary who chooses a set A e ∈ A to control, and all three α-conditions are satisfied. We now show that the three α-conditions imply the three properties of A 1 , A 2 in Definition 5.
-From condition α-1, since all vectors received on P \ P f are modified, we
have P e ∪ P f = P (i.e., corresponding to Definition 5(a)). -Condition α-2 indicates that either P
(1) f = ∅, or the adversary can learn the key initiated by node A f p j on any path p j ∈ P
(1) f to make the faulty message m l qualified on ((A f p j ) ∼ p j ). Due to Lemma 4, this means that the adversary can separate S and R on p j , completely eavesdrop on p j or control a neighbor of A f p j . Thus from condition α-2 we can conclude that P
(1) f = ∅, or for each path p j ∈ P
(1) f , we have that p j ∈ P e ∪ P ( * ) e or A f p j has a neighbor in A e (i.e., corresponding to Definition 5(c)).
-Finally, since P e = P and P e ∪ P f = P , there exists at least one path p k ∈ P f such that the message m k received on p k is the actual message. Due to condition α-3, there are two cases: case 1 P f ∪ P ( * ) f = P , thus we have P
(1) e ⊆ P f ∪ P ( * ) f = P ; case 2 The actual message m k is not qualified on any (v i ∼ p j ) where p j ∈ P \ (P f ∪ P ( * ) f ) and v i does not have a neighbor in A f . This implies that either p j ∈ P (+) e , or p j ∈ P (1) e but any v i on p j that does not have a neighbor in A f is not A e p j (because otherwise the actual message m k should be qualified on (v i ∼ p j ), due to the proof of Lemma 2). That is, if such p j ∈ P (1) e exists, then all the nodes on p j that do not have a neighbor in A f are not A e p j . This implies that A e p j has a neighbor in A f .
It is easy to conclude that in either case, P
(1) e = ∅, or for each path p j ∈ P
(1) e , we have p j ∈ P f ∪ P ( * ) f or A e p j has a neighbor in A f (i.e., corresponding to Definition 5(b)).
To sum up, A e , A f are as A 1 , A 2 in Definition 5. This means S and R are lowly 2A-separated, which contradicts the condition of Theorem 1.
Therefore, at the end of the Reliable Transmission Protocol, R can recover m l = m with an arbitrarily small probability of failure (i.e., Pr[RT ] < yn 2 |F| ). Thus the Reliable Transmission Protocol is a δ-RMT protocol.
Perfect Reliability
Here we study 0-RMT in multicast graphs. Similar to the result in [7] , we show that the necessary and sufficient condition for 0-RMT in the multicast setting is the same as that in the point-to-point setting. The following theorem can be easily proven following some previous results in [8, 5] .
Theorem 2 Given a graph G(V, E) and an adversary structure A on V \{S, R}. The necessary and sufficient condition for 0-RMT from S to R is that P i ∪P j = P for any two sets A i , A j ∈ A.
Proof. See the full version of this paper [1].
Secure Communication
In this section we take the problem of achieving privacy into consideration. We study almost perfect security in Section 5.1; i.e., we discuss both ( , δ)-SMT and (0, δ)-SMT. In Section 5.2, we study (0, 0)-SMT that enables perfect security.
Almost Perfect Security
First we give the necessary and sufficient condition for ( , δ)-SMT in multicast graphs. Unlike the setting in [7] in which the conditions for both δ-RMT and ( , δ)-SMT are the same (i.e., n > t), in multicast graphs, ( , δ)-SMT requires stronger connectivity than that for δ-RMT.
Theorem 3 Given a graph G(V, E) and an adversary structure A on V \{S, R}. The necessary and sufficient condition for ( , δ)-SMT from S to R is that S and R are highly A-connected and lowly 2A-connected.
Proof. We first prove the necessity of the condition. It is straightforward that the high A-connectivity, i.e., P i ∪ P ( * ) i = P , is necessary for achieving -privacy, because otherwise there is no private transmission between S and R on any path in P . Moreover, as proven in Lemma 7, the low 2A-connectivity is necessary for achieving δ-reliability. Thus the condition is necessary for ( , δ)-SMT.
Next we show that the condition is sufficient. Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p n }, we give the following protocol (similar to [8, 15] ) for S to send a message m ∈ M to R.
Private Transmission Protocol
1. The nodes of V execute an instance of the Private Propagation Protocol from S to R in which for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, S sends a pair (a S j , b S j ) ∈ R F on path p j ∈ P . At the end of the instance, R receives a pair (a R j , b R j ) on each path p j ∈ P . 2. R chooses an element r R ∈ R F and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, computes s End.
First we show that this protocol achieves -privacy. Suppose that the adversary chooses a set A e to control. Since P e ∪ P ( * ) e = P , there exists a path p d ∈ P \ (P e ∪ P ( * ) e ). As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, the adversary cannot learn (a
Let RT denote the event that the instance of the Reliable Transmission Protocol in
Step 2 succeeds and RT denote the event otherwise. In the event RT , r S = r R and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have s Next we show that the protocol achieves δ-reliability. Let δ 1 be the probability that the instance of the Reliable Transmission Protocol in Step 2 fails and δ 2 be the probability that the instance in Step 3 fails. As we showed in the proof of Lemma 8, δ 1 and δ 2 are negligible in the security parameter. Let δ 3 be the probability that both the above mentioned instances succeed, but R outputs m = m. This can only happen if there exists at least one j ∈ I such that a S j = a R j . Since both reliable protocols succeed, the fact j ∈ I implies auth(r R ; a
where a Step 1, then the probability that Eq. 3 is fulfilled is 1 |F| . Since the adversary can corrupt |P e | paths, it is straightforward that δ 3 = |Pe| |F| < n |F| , which is much smaller than δ 1 and δ 2 . Thus the final probability that the protocol fails to be reliable is
To sum up, the Private Transmission Protocol is an ( , δ)-SMT protocol.
Note that the condition of Theorem 3 can be seen as it consists of two parts, with the high A-connectivity enables private communication and the low 2A-connectivity enables δ-reliable communication. These two types of connectivity are independent. Indeed, with some examples in Section 6, we can show that they do not imply each other.
In [16] , Yang and Desmedt proved that reducing the requirement for privacy does not weaken the minimal connectivity. In the following theorem, we show that the condition for ( , δ)-SMT is also necessary and sufficient for (0, δ)-SMT.
Theorem 4 Given a graph G(V, E) and an adversary structure A on V \{S, R}. The necessary and sufficient condition for (0, δ)-SMT from S to R is that S and R are highly A-connected and lowly 2A-connected.
Proof. It is straightforward that the condition is necessary. Next we show that the condition is sufficient by slightly amending the Private Transmission Protocol to the following protocol which achieves perfect privacy.
Perfectly Private Transmission Protocol

Same as
Step 1 in the Private Transmission Protocol. 2. R chooses an element r R ∈ R F and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, computes s End.
Now we show that this protocol achieves 0-privacy. Following the proof of Theorem 3, the privacy of the message transmission can only be breached in the event RT . It is clear that the instance of the Reliable Transmission Protocol in Step 2 allows S to distinguish the events RT and RT . As we showed in the proof of Lemma 8, in the event RT , only the correct vector can be output after the Reliable Transmission Protocol. This means if two different vectors can be output, then the event RT occurs. Thus in Step 2, Case 1 indicates RT and Case 2 indicates RT . In the event RT , S terminates the protocol so the adversary learns nothing about the message. Thus the protocol achieves 0-privacy. 6 Next, using a similar proof as that for Theorem 3, we can prove that the Perfectly Private Transmission Protocol is also δ-reliable, which concludes the proof.
Perfect Security
In [6] , Dolev et al. showed that if σ is the maximum number of channels that a listening (passive) adversary can control and ρ is the maximum number of channels that a disrupting (active) adversary can control, then there must be at least max{σ + ρ + 1, 2ρ + 1} channels between S and R for PSMT (i.e., (0, 0)-SMT). This setting can be generalized in our model as follows: given an adversary structure A = {A 1 , . . . , A z }, then {P 1 ∪P ( * ) 1 , . . . , P z ∪P ( * ) z } consists of the subsets of paths a listening adversary can control and {P 1 , . . . , P z } consists of the subsets of paths a disrupting adversary can control. Thus we give the following theorem for (0, 0)-SMT in multicast graphs.
Theorem 5 Given a graph G(V, E) and an adversary structure A on V \{S, R}. The necessary and sufficient condition for (0,0)-SMT from S to R is that
Corresponding Threshold Model
In this section we use our results in the general adversary model to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for RMT and SMT in the threshold model. Because a threshold is a special case of an adversary structure, we re-define the threshold model in the adversary structure context.
Definition 6
Given a graph G(V, E), a threshold t is an adversary structure
Furthermore, -we say that S and R are t ζ-private -connected if they are highly A T -connected; -we say that S and R are t ζ-reliable -connected if they are lowly 2A
T -connected.
It is easy to show that our results correspond to Franklin and Wright's [7] if the multicast graph only consists of n node-disjoint and neighbor-disjoint paths. For more details see the full version of this paper [1].
Next we discuss the connectivity in the general multicast graph setting with some previous results. In [4] , Desmedt and Wang looked at four different types of connectivity. With slight changes, we show them in our model as follows.
-t-connectivity. For any A ∈ A T , after removing all nodes in A from G, there remains a path between S and R.
-weak t hyper -connectivity. For any A ∈ A T , after removing from the hypergraph H G (V, E H ) all nodes in A and all hyperedges on each of which there is at least one node in A, there remains a path between S and R (see [9] ). -t neighbor -connectivity. For any A ∈ A T , after removing all nodes in A and all their neighbors from G, there remains a path between S and R.
-weak (n, t)-connectivity. There are n node-disjoint paths p 1 , . . . , p n between S and R, and for any A ∈ A T , after removing all nodes in A and all their neighbors from G, there remains a path p i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) between S and R. As we showed in the proof of Lemma 1, Franklin and Yung's weak t hyperconnectivity [9] in a hypergraph H G is essentially our t ζ-private -connectivity in a multicast graph G. Thus we use the t ζ-private -connectivity to replace the weak t hyper -connectivity in the rest of the paper for a simpler presentation. Desmedt and Wang [4] showed that the following implications are strict:
weak (n, t)-connectivity ⇒ t neighbor -connectivity ⇒ t ζ-private -connectivity ⇒ t-connectivity.
In [14] , Wang and Desmedt claimed that the weak (n, t)-connectivity is sufficient for (0, δ)-SMT. Since weak (n, t)-connectivity ⇒ t ζ-private -connectivity, it is clear that 0-privacy can be achieved. However, δ-reliability is only achievable under their condition if weak (n, t)-connectivity ⇒ t ζ-reliable -connectivity. In [14] , there is not a proper proof showing this implication. Thus their claim is only a conjecture. We leave this as an open problem.
Later study by Desmedt and Wang [4] showed that the conjectured upper bound, i.e., the weak (n, t)-connectivity, is not necessary for (0, δ)-SMT, by showing an example, as Fig. 2(a) , in which S and R are not weakly (2, 1)-connected but (0, δ)-SMT is possible. We observe that their protocol (appeared in [15] ) is actually an ( , δ)-SMT protocol but the claim is correct, because S and R are obviously 1 ζ-private -connected and 1 ζ-reliable -connected in Fig. 2(a) . They also showed that the weak t hyper -connectivity (i.e., the t ζ-private -connectivity) is the lower bound for (0, δ)-SMT but not necessary for δ-RMT, as in Fig. 2(b) where S and R are not 1 ζ-private -connected but δ-RMT is possible. This claim is obvious under our condition because S and R are clearly 1 ζ-reliable -connected. Finally they conjectured that the weak t hyper -connectivity (i.e., the t ζ-privateconnectivity) is not sufficient for (0, δ)-SMT, by asking whether (0, δ)-SMT is possible in Fig. 2(c) such that S and R are 1 ζ-private -connected. Our condition proves their conjecture. Indeed, not only is (0, δ)-SMT impossible in Fig. 2(c) , but δ-RMT is also impossible, because S and R are not 1 ζ-reliable -connected. Therefore, our result explains all the examples and proves all the conjectures in the previous work.
Note that the examples of Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 2 (c) also show that the t ζ-privateconnectivity (or, the high A-connectivity) and the t ζ-reliable -connectivity (or, the low 2A-connectivity) do not imply each other, because in Fig. 2(b) , S and R are 1 ζ-reliable -connected but not 1 ζ-private -connected, and in Fig. 2(c) , they are 1 ζ-private -connected but not 1 ζ-reliable -connected.
At the end, we present the following corollary as the final result of this paper.
Corollary 1 Given a graph G(V, E) and an adversary who can control up to t nodes in V \ {S, R}.
-δ-RMT is possible if and only if S and R are t ζ-reliable -connected in G.
-0-RMT is possible if and only if S and R are 2t-connected in G.
-( , δ)-SMT or (0, δ)-SMT is possible if and only if S and R are t ζ-privateconnected and t ζ-reliable -connected in G. -(0,0)-SMT is possible if and only if S and R are (t ζ-private + t)-connected in G. The (t ζ-private + t)-connectivity means that for any A i , A j ∈ A T , we have (P i ∪ P ( * ) i ) ∪ P j = P .
